Illinois Found the One Weapon Against Prediction Markets That Doesn't Require Calling Them Gambling. A Republican Just Filed to Throw It Away.
The exchange-wager tax has been law for ten weeks, is the target of the CFTC's amended complaint, and would survive Illinois losing every jurisdictional argument it has. H.B. 5811 would repeal it before a judge ever rules.
September 8, 2026 at 5:44 PM EDT
6 min read
Editor's note: TrueEdge builds odds tools and earns affiliate commissions from licensed sportsbooks. This piece argues a position on prediction-market regulation, and our commercial interest runs toward the sportsbooks. Weigh it accordingly.
Illinois Rep. Travis Weaver, a Republican, filed H.B. 5811 on Wednesday, September 2. It does one thing: it strikes the "exchange wager" definition out of the Illinois Sports Wagering Act and repeals the transaction tax attached to it. Sportsbooks keep paying 20% to 40% on adjusted gross receipts plus a per-wager fee of 25 cents on the first 20 million wagers and 50 cents after. Prediction markets would pay nothing.
The tax he wants gone is ten weeks old. It came in through Senate Bill 3019, part of the FY2027 budget Gov. JB Pritzker signed in June, and took effect July 1: 1.75% on a platform's first five million exchange wagers in a fiscal year, 3.5% on every one after that. The same law required prediction-market operators to hold an Illinois gambling license.
Nobody has collected a reported dollar of it. The Illinois Gaming Board has not published July's numbers. Three federal lawsuits are pointed at it or at the statute around it, and none has been decided.
Repealing it now would be a mistake, and not for the reason the Gaming Board would give.
Why the tax is the only durable thing Illinois built
Every other state instrument in this fight depends on winning the same contested question: are sports event contracts gambling? Arizona's criminal case does. Michigan's injunction does. Nevada's does. New Jersey's certiorari petition, filed September 2 and docketed as Flaherty v. KalshiEX, exists because the Third Circuit said no in April and the Ninth Circuit said yes on August 28. If the Supreme Court takes that case and rules for Kalshi, the cease-and-desists collapse together.
A tax does not depend on that answer. States tax activities they cannot prohibit all the time. Illinois does not need an event contract to be a wager under the Sports Wagering Act in order to levy a transaction tax on a business transacted with Illinois residents; it needs the tax to be non-discriminatory, not a disguised ban, and connected to the state. That is a much lower bar than "these are bets." Weaver's bill hands away the one piece of leverage that survives Illinois losing everything else.
Which is precisely why the CFTC went after it. The agency sued Illinois in April 2026 over the Gaming Board's cease-and-desist letters — Administrator Marcus Fruchter's office sent them to Kalshi, Polymarket, Crypto.com and Robinhood — and then, on June 19, the day Pritzker signed the budget, amended its complaint specifically to reach the tax and moved for a preliminary injunction. Its language, quoted from the amended pleading: the state's "attempt to regulate CFTC-regulated DCMs and target these DCMs by singling them out" for special fees interferes with the agency's exclusive authority. Coinbase had already sued in December 2025, before the tax existed. Kalshi sued on June 25 in the Northern District of Illinois, naming Pritzker, Attorney General Kwame Raoul, Fruchter and four board members, and sought a temporary restraining order before July 1. As of today none of the three cases has produced a merits ruling we can find.
Illinois picked the right weapon and loaded it wrong
Here is the problem with 1.75%, and it is arithmetic rather than ideology.
A sportsbook tax is levied on gross gaming revenue — the money the house keeps. Illinois takes 20% to 40% of that. An exchange does not keep the spread; it charges a fee for matching two people who each put up cash, and that fee is a thin slice of a contract rather than a share of the loser's stake. The CFTC's amended complaint makes the comparison directly: the Illinois levy "likely meets or exceeds the per-transaction fees the DCMs charge traders — especially at the 3.5% level — effectively operating as an outright ban."
Set aside whether a federal agency is the right party to be making that argument. As a description of the arithmetic it is probably correct, and that is the flaw. Illinois did not build a tax that takes a share of the operator's margin. At the top rate it built one that can exceed the margin.
We have to be careful here, because the statutory base is not clear from the reporting we can read. Every account we found describes the levy as 1.75% "on each exchange wager" or "per transaction" without pinning what the percentage is taken of — the notional value of the contract, the premium paid, or the operator's fee. Those three produce wildly different answers, and the difference between a nuisance and a prohibition sits inside that ambiguity. We do not know which it is. The reported license terms are muddled too: Capitol News Illinois describes a $15 million initial fee good for four years with $1 million renewals, while Focus Gaming News describes a $1 million master prediction-market license fee. Both cannot be the headline number and we are not going to pick one.
That fog is itself the flaw. A tax written so that nobody covering it can state its base is a tax that invites exactly the CFTC's characterisation — a levy that "could effectively act as a ban." Illinois had a defensible instrument and drafted it in a way that makes the de-facto-prohibition argument easy. The fix is a rate and a base a court would call a tax. The fix is not repeal.
The best argument for Weaver's bill
It is a decent one, and it is not about prediction markets at all.
Illinois has a habit of taxing this sector in a way that outruns the sector's economics. The per-wager fee on sportsbooks — 25 cents, then 50 — is levied per bet regardless of size, which falls hardest on the small recreational wager and hardest of all on the low-hold, high-volume products. Operators responded by adding minimum bet sizes and surcharges. The exchange-wager tax repeats the same design error on a business with even thinner unit margins. A legislator who watched that film once can reasonably conclude the state should stop building revenue lines out of transaction counts before it collects a dollar, rather than after it loses a year in federal court and refunds the money with interest.
There is also a plain fiscal-conservatism read: the state levied a tax that four companies have credibly told a court is unconstitutional, budgeted nothing verifiable against it, and is now spending Attorney General resources defending it in three cases at once. Cutting the loss is not surrender; it is triage.
That argument is right that the tax is badly built. It is wrong that repeal is the cheap way out, for one specific reason: H.B. 5811 leaves the sportsbook taxes exactly where they are. It creates a jurisdiction where a DraftKings parlay on the Bears is taxed at up to 40% of revenue plus 50 cents a ticket, and an economically indistinguishable Bears contract on an exchange is taxed at zero. That is not neutrality. That is a state subsidising the migration of its own betting market into a channel it does not supervise and cannot tax — and doing it voluntarily, without being ordered to, while three courts still have the question.
What we would want instead
Rewrite the base. Tax the operator's fee revenue, not the transaction, at a rate that lands in the same neighbourhood as what a sportsbook pays on the same economic activity. That is harder to call a ban, harder to call discriminatory, and it does not depend on Illinois winning the argument about what an event contract is. It also has the virtue of being honest about what the state actually wants, which is not to stop prediction markets but to be paid the same way it is paid by everyone else taking Illinois money on Illinois games.
H.B. 5811 is a two-page bill filed by a backbencher in the minority, and the likeliest outcome is that it never gets a committee hearing. Treat it as a signal rather than a threat. The signal is that Illinois' own legislature has started to doubt the instrument, ten weeks in, with no ruling and no revenue report. If the Gaming Board wants the tax to survive, the thing to publish is July's collections. Silence is doing Weaver's work for him.