Developing Kalshi Took the Cheapest Meeting in Washington, and It Was the Wrong One
Senate Banking Republicans sat down privately with Tarek Mansour at 10 a.m. Wednesday. By the afternoon all seven committee Democrats had signed a letter demanding a public hearing instead. The industry needs a statute, and statutes do not come out of one-party roundtables.
September 23, 2026 at 6:34 PM EDT
5 min read
At 10 a.m. on Wednesday, the Republican members of the Senate Banking Committee met privately with Kalshi chief executive Tarek Mansour. Chairman Tim Scott said afterwards that the session covered securities-linked products, keeping innovation in the United States, how investors actually use these products, retail protection, and what regulatory questions Congress ought to take up.
Within hours, all seven Democrats on the committee had signed a letter telling Scott to do it again in public. Elizabeth Warren, the ranking member, was joined by Catherine Cortez Masto, Jack Reed, Mark Warner, Raphael Warnock, Ruben Gallego and Angela Alsobrooks. The line getting quoted is the sharp one: Congress should examine prediction markets "on a bipartisan basis in a public hearing – not behind closed doors in a Republican-only, industry-friendly roundtable."
The obvious read is that this is a procedural squabble dressed up as principle, and that Warren would find prediction markets objectionable in any room, at any hour, under any lighting. The obvious read is largely correct.
It is also beside the point, because the person who lost most on Wednesday was Mansour.
The thing Kalshi actually needs
Kalshi's legal position right now is a stack of contingencies. The CFTC sued Arizona, Connecticut and Illinois in April to establish what it called "clear and longstanding exclusive jurisdiction to regulate event contracts under the Commodity Exchange Act." It then sued New York's gaming regulators. In August it reached for emergency authority to order Kalshi to keep operating in New York while that fight ran. Forty-four state attorneys general have told the agency in writing that it has no authority over sports event contracts at all. The Third Circuit has ruled one way on preemption and the Ninth Circuit ruled 3-0 the other way on August 28.
Every one of those is an agency asserting a reading of a 1974 statute that Congress has never updated for this product.
An agency reading can be reversed by the next agency. An emergency order is by construction temporary. A circuit split gets resolved by nine people who have shown no particular enthusiasm for expansive readings of old commodity statutes. The only thing that makes a national prediction-market industry durable is an Act of Congress that says event contracts are federally regulated and says what that means for sports.
That requires sixty votes. Sixty votes requires Democrats.
What a closed-door roundtable buys, and what it costs
Private member meetings are entirely normal and are not scandalous. Every industry does them. They are how staff get educated and how relationships form, and a chief executive who declined them would be malpracticing.
But look at the trade. Kalshi got a friendly hour with the half of the committee that already agrees with it — and handed the other half a free, true, quotable grievance, on a day when the company also had a margin filing at the CFTC and a fresh staff advisory about its mention markets to explain. The marginal persuasive value of that hour was close to zero. The cost was a letter with seven signatures on it, one of which belongs to the most effective adversarial communicator in the Senate.
The deeper problem is that the industry's entire public argument is legitimacy by familiarity. We are a regulated exchange. We have a clearing house. We file with a federal regulator. We are not a bookmaker; we are market infrastructure. That argument is undermined every time the company behaves like a lobbying client rather than a listed venue. Financial market infrastructure testifies. It sits at the witness table and answers hostile questions about settlement risk and retail losses, and it is boring, and the boringness is the entire product.
Mansour should be asking for the hearing.
Where we cannot follow the Democrats
The letter's substantive claims deserve more scepticism than they are getting.
We could not open the letter itself, and the volume figures attributed to it come from secondary accounts: growth from roughly $5 billion to about $24 billion by April 2026, and December trading of nearly $12 billion across Polymarket and Kalshi described as a 400 per cent annual rise. Those numbers do not obviously line up with other published series — Pew's read of the same two platforms this week has combined monthly volume going from $26 billion in May to $53 billion in July. Some of that gap is notional-versus-executed dollars, a distinction that badly flatters any headline built on multi-leg contracts, and some of it is different months. We do not know which figures the senators actually used, and neither does anyone quoting them.
The claim that a few accounts take the profits while most participants lose is very likely true and is also true of every retail derivatives venue ever studied. As an argument for a hearing it is fine. As an argument for a particular rule it does no work until somebody specifies the rule.
The strongest thing in the letter is the jurisdictional point, and it is stronger than the senators made it. Scott described Wednesday's agenda as "securities-linked products." Cboe has asked the SEC about all-or-nothing options tied to corporate earnings. Banking is not the committee with CFTC oversight — that is Agriculture. So the committee that took the meeting is the one with jurisdiction over the regulator that does not currently regulate these products, discussing a category that may be drifting toward the regulator it does oversee. That muddle is not a talking point. It is the actual reason a statute is needed, and it is why a single-committee, single-party roundtable was never going to produce one.
The best case against all of this
The serious objection is that public hearings are worse than useless for complicated products. A hearing is five-minute rounds, prepared gotchas and a clip for the evening. Nobody has ever learned how a clearing house sets collateral from a Senate hearing. Private briefings, whatever they look like, are where members and staff actually absorb mechanics, and demanding that education happen on camera is a demand that it not happen at all.
That objection is right about hearings and wrong about the decision. Kalshi does not need Congress to understand it. Kalshi needs Congress to legislate, and legislating is a public act with a public record. A company that will eventually require a bipartisan floor vote cannot keep accepting invitations that are structurally incapable of producing one.
There is a version of this where Scott holds the public hearing, Warren is unpleasant for five minutes, Mansour answers, and the industry is meaningfully closer to a bill than it was on Tuesday. That trade is available and cheap. It is strange to watch a company built entirely on pricing expected value decline it.
Editor's note: TrueEdge builds odds and line-shopping tools and earns affiliate commissions from licensed sportsbooks. We have a commercial interest in how prediction markets and sportsbooks are regulated relative to one another. This piece argues a position; weigh it accordingly.